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Auction theory has emphasized the importance of private infor-
mation to the proﬁts of bidders. However, the theory has failed to
consider the question of whether or not bidders will be able to keep
their information private. We show that in a variety of contexts bid-
ders will reveal all their information, even if this information revelation
is (ex ante) detrimental to them. Similarly, a seller may reveal all her
information even when this revelation lowers revenues. We also show
that bidders may be harmed by private information.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C7, D44.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
An auction with interdependent values involves the sale of a good whose
(expected) value to each bidder depends upon public information as well as
information privately held by the bidders and the seller. For instance, the
value of a painting purportedly by Hyppolite will depend on each party’s
estimation that the artwork is authentic. Though the idiosyncratic informa-
tion the various agents possess might initially be private, much of it may be
veriﬁable and nothing prevents the agents from revealing such information if
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1they choose to do so. Indeed, it is well known that in a symmetric auction,
when the agents’ signals are aﬃliated1 i) if the seller can publicly commit
to a revelation policy she will maximize ex ante revenue by committing to
always reveal her information (Milgrom and Weber (1982a)) and ii)e v e n
if the seller cannot make a such a commitment, she will always reveal her
information in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Milgrom (1987)). In contrast,
there has been little investigation into the revelation behavior of the buyers.
Perhaps this paucity stems from the belief that “it is more important to a
bidder that his information be private than that it be precise.” (McAfee and
McMillan (1987)).
However, even if it is true that bidders proﬁt from the privacy of their
information, it does not follow that they will be able to refrain from revealing
it. Suppose that signals are aﬃliated. Even if, say, bidder 1 favors an ex ante
policy of never revealing his signal, ex post he may well prefer to conceal
highly positive signals, but reveal very negative signals. This is because a
negative signal has the potential to depress the bids of the other players,
both because their valuations of the object have fallen and because they
expect the other players to lower their bids. Thus, absent the possibility of
commitment, in many cases bidder 1 will in fact reveal dismal information.
But if the other players know that bidder 1 is acting thus, he will be “forced”
to reveal moderately poor information as well, since this information becomes
dismal relative to the possibilities the other players entertain if no disclosure
is made. The argument can be reapplied iteratively, so that the bidder ends
up revealing even positive signals.
Though this type of unraveling argument is familiar in other contexts, the
fact that bidders will often deleteriously reveal their information may have
escaped attention because they will not necessarily do so in the simplest
models of common value auctions. However, these models are misleading in
this regard. Indeed, we will argue that they are discontinuous in the sense
that slight modeling changes can lead from a situation of no information
revelation to one of almost complete revelation. Private information will
also be revealed in very diﬀerent contexts, including some pure private value
auctions.
The literature on auction theory has emphasized the beneﬁts of private
information to buyers. Typical comments include “A bidder without special
1Roughly speaking, high values of one agent’s estimates make high values of the other
agents’ estimates more likely.
2private information ... can never earn a positive expected payoﬀ” (Milgrom
(1981)) and “the winning bidder’s surplus is due to her private information”
(Klemperer (1999)). However, this literature is at best incomplete since it has
not considered whether or not bidders will be able to keep their information
private, at least when it is veriﬁable. Moreover, in many important auctions
much information is indeed veriﬁable. For instance, telecommunications ﬁrms
bidding on licenses often hire consultants to help them estimate the value of
these licenses. The consultants’ reports can easily be made public. Similarly,
geological reports about oil tracts to be auctioned oﬀ can be disseminated.
Furthermore, there is more than just a lacuna in the theory: a bidder may
actually be harmed by private information. This ﬁnding is in sharp contrast
with the received theory, as illustrated by Milgrom and Weber’s (1982b) ﬁnd-
ing that a “bidder’s proﬁts rise when he gathers extra information” (absent
the possibility of information revelation).
2 No Revelation
We begin with a standard pure common value model in which it is an equi-
librium for the players not to reveal any information. We then modify the
game slightly to obtain a game where full information revelation is the unique
outcome.
There are 2 risk-neutral bidders. The value of the good to both bidders is
given by V = v(X1,X 2), where Xi is player i’s private signal. Consider, say,
a simple ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction. Under weak conditions the game has
a positive value to each player. Suppose the signals are veriﬁable and alter
the game by adding a preliminary stage in which either bidder can reveal
her signal. A bidder that chooses to disclose her information earns zero in
the ensuing auction, regardless of the revelation policy of the other bidders
(Milgrom and Weber (1982b)). Thus, neither player has an incentive to
divulge any realization of a signal, favorable or unfavorable. This conclusion
is quite misleading, however. It depends upon the fact that a player with no
private information always earns zero. This fact itself is driven by at least
two aspects of the model.
i) No Private Component. As the name suggests, in a pure common
value auction there is no private component to the bidders’ valuations. With
respect to mineral rights, Milgrom and Weber (1982a, p. 1093) argue that
this simpliﬁcation is appropriate since “To a ﬁrst approximation, the values
3of these mineral rights to the various bidders can be regarded as equal.”
However, while this ﬁrst approximation is harmless for the usual analytical
purposes it is deceptive when considering the disclosure of information.
ii) Imprecision. Each player’s information is either precisely revealed
or not revealed at all. Players must reveal their information in a veriﬁable
manner, which limits the strategies available to them. Nonetheless, the im-
plicit assumption that players must end up disclosing all or none of their
information is unduly restrictive. Consider an auction for an oil tract. A
bidder investigating the worth of the tract might ﬁrst receive a preliminary
estimate indicating whether the value of the tract is say, low, medium, or
high and then a more accurate indication within the initial category. Since
the latter information dominates the former, it might seem without loss of
generality to ignore the ﬁrst signal. However, explicit recognition of the two
signals allows the bidder to reveal only the initial estimate, which, as we shall
see, is important.
Modifying either of these aspects can have dramatic consequences. In the
next section we illustrate this claim with an example that we will reconsider
in greater detail in Section 4.1.
2.1 Full Revelation: An Example
Consider a good worth z1 + w to player 1 and w to player 2. The private
component z1 is common knowledge, but only player 1 is informed of the
signal w, which is drawn from the uniform distribution on [0,1]. The good
is sold via a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction in which player 1 wins the good if
his bid is at least as large as player 2’s bid. First suppose that z1 =0 . 2 The
auction has a unique equilibrium in which player 1 bids
1






with cumulative distribution 2b. Player 1 receives an ex ante payoﬀ
of 1
6. Furthermore, given any realization of w>0, player 1 earns a strictly
positive (expected) payoﬀ. Now give player 1 the opportunity to disclose his
signal w. If he does so, both players bid w in the ensuing auction, yielding 1
a payoﬀ of 0. Thus player 1 has no incentive to disclose any realized signal
and there is an equilibrium in which player 1 refrains from ever making such
a disclosure. Note that a policy of disclosing all his signals would earn player
1a ne xa n t ep a y o ﬀo f0 .
Now suppose that z1 is arbitrarily small but strictly positive. The ﬁrst-
2Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al (1983) solve the model for this z1 =0c a s e .
4price auction has an equilibrium which approximates the z1 = 0 equilibrium,











lative distribution approximately 2b.3 Player 1 receives an ex ante payoﬀ of
approximately
1
6. Again give player 1 the opportunity to disclose his signal
w. If he does so, both players again bid w in the ensuing auction’s (un-
dominated) equilibrium, yielding player1ap a y o ﬀo fz1 ≈ 0. A policy of
disclosing all signals again harms player 1, earning him an ex ante payoﬀ
of approximately 0. Thus far, our analysis of the case z1 ≈ 0 mirrors our
analysis of the z1 = 0 case. There is, however, a crucial diﬀerence.
Suppose that player 1 has received a signal w ≤ z1. If 1 discloses this
signal, in the ensuing auction player 2 bids w instead of randomizing between
z1 ≥ w and higher bids. Hence, player 1 will in fact disclose any signal
w ≤ z1, thereby earning z1 instead of strictly less. By continuity, there
exists a w >z 1 such that player 1 will also disclose all w<w . But then if
player 1 does not disclose a signal w, player 2 knows that w ≥ w , and in the
ensuing equilibrium 2 randomizes among bids w and above. Player 1 beneﬁts
from disclosing w and all signals w<w ￿ for some w￿ >w . The argument
can be reapplied, leading to the conclusion that in any equilibrium, player
1 essentially reveals all his information despite the fact that this is ex ante
detrimental to him.
3 A General Framework
In this section we develop a general framework for analyzing information
revelation in auctions. The reader who is only interested in the applications
can skip this section and proceed directly to Section 4.
In a fairly general auction setting, there are n players each of whom
receives a veriﬁable private signal Xi drawn from the joint distribution F.A
good whose value to player i is vi (X1,X 2,...,X n) is to be auctioned oﬀ. At
the interim stage in which i has seen a signal xi, but before the auction takes
place, i has an expected equilibrium payoﬀ which we can write as ˆ ui (xi,F)
(if the auction has multiple equilibria, assume that some selection has been
made).
Now suppose that each player is given the option of disclosing her signal
before playing the auction. Since the signal is veriﬁable, its disclosure must
be truthful. We have the following game:
3A precise description is given in Section 4.1.
51. Nature chooses (x1,x 2,...,x n) from F; player i is informed only of xi.
2. Each player i reports ti ∈ {xi,∅}.
3. The good is auctioned oﬀ.
In eﬀect, the disclosure option in stage 2 changes the joint distribution
from which the signals are drawn for the auction in stage 3. In the overall
equilibrium of this new game, following the reports the bidders play to an
equilibrium of the auction using an updated conditional joint distribution
function. Let ri : Xi →{ Xi,∅} be a reporting strategy for player i. Given a
(presumed) reporting strategy combination r and the (actual) reports t,l e t
F (·|t,r) be the joint distribution of x conditional on t and r. In the auction
of stage 3, a player i with signal xi gets a payoﬀ of ˆ ui(xi,F(·|t,r)), which is
simply i’s equilibrium payoﬀ in a standard setting where the types are drawn
from the distribution F (·|t,r).
Now consider stage 2 where player i has seen his own signal xi, but before
the reports of the other players are made public. If the other players follow
r, while player i reports ti, then i has an expected payoﬀ of
Ex−iˆ ui(xi,F(·|(ti,r −i(x−i)),r)), (1)
which is derived by taking an expectation over x−i given xi, and where
(ti,r −i(x−i)) ≡ (r1(x1),...,ti,...,rn (xn)). For instance, suppose n =3a n d
that the conditional distribution function has an associated density function.
Then, player 1 has an expected payoﬀ of
￿￿
ˆ u1(x1,F(·|(t1,r 2(z2),r 3(z3)),r))f (z2,z 3 | x1)dz2dz3.
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game is a reporting strategy com-
bination r∗ in which ti = r∗
i (xi) maximizes (1) for all i and all xi ∈ Xi.
As a preliminary to the general result of the next section deﬁne
ui (xi,t i,r) ≡ Ex−iˆ ui (xi,F(·|(ti,r −i (x−i)),r)). (2)












63.1 The Disclosure Game
We now derive a general unravelling result which enables us to avoid dupli-
cating unravelling arguments in our various auction applications.
We ﬁrst deﬁne a generic n-person game in which each player i receives a
private veriﬁable signal Xi drawn from a compact set Xi ⊆ R, and is given
the option of (truthfully) disclosing it. A disclosure game is the following
three stage game:
1. Nature chooses (x1,x 2,...,xn) according to the distribution F; player i
is informed only of xi.
2. Each player i c h o o s e sar e p o r tti ∈ {xi,∅}.
3. Each player i receives a payoﬀ ui (xi,t i,r), where ri : Xi →{ Xi,∅} such
that ∀xi ∈ Xi ri (xi) ∈{ xi,∅}.
We can think of ri as a reporting strategy for player i.












Thus, a disclosure game equilibrium is a reporting strategy combination
such that each type of each player maximizes by following the reporting
strategy.4 When u is an auction payoﬀ, as in (2) of the previous section,
a disclosure game equilibrium gives a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
auction preceded by the possibility of disclosure, and vice-versa.
Given a joint distribution F, let Fi be the marginal distribution of Xi.W e
will (abusively) use F and Fi to denote probability measures as well. Thus,
Fi (Xi >x i) ≡ 1 − Fi (xi), while Fi{Xi = xi} =P r Fi (Xi = xi). As usual,
F (·|t,r) denotes the joint distribution conditional on t and r. Correspond-
ingly, Fi (·|ti,r i) is the marginal distribution conditional on i’s report and
reporting strategy. Observe that since xi is veriﬁable, Fi(Xi = xi | xi,r i) ≡
PrFi(·|xi,ri)(Xi = xi) = 1 regardless of ri.
4Note that a disclosure game equilibrium is not equivalent to a Nash equilibrium of the
disclosure game.
7Given a strategy proﬁle r, we say that player i’s signal is almost surely
known if either ri (xi)=xi for almost all xi ∈ Xi,o rFi (Xi = xi |∅ ,r i)
= 1 for some xi ∈ Xi. That is, the set of undisclosed signals with positive
measure is at most a singleton.
We now give a suﬃcient condition for player i to essentially disclose all
her information. Theorem 1 says that if player i always wants to disclose a
signal at the bottom of the support of her signals, then she will essentially
reveal (almost) all her signals.
Theorem 1 Suppose that for all xi ∈ Xi and reporting strategies r, ui (xi,x i,r) >
ui(xi,∅,r), whenever min{Support Fi (·|∅ ,r i)} = xi and Fi(Xi >x i |∅ ,r i) >
0. Suppose further that ui(xi,x i,r) and ui(xi,∅,r) are continuous functions
of xi. Then player i’s signal is almost surely known in any disclosure game
equilibrium.
Proof. All proofs are in the appendix
The above theorem is a general result about unravelling. In contrast
to most results in the literature about unravelling (for instance, Grossman
(1981) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986)), it covers the case of many informed
parties. The previous result which is most similar to Theorem 1 is in Okuno-
Fujiwara et al. (1990), where several informed parties play a revelation stage,
and then a game amongst themselves. Both our result and theirs show that
strategic considerations do not alter the standard result that full revelation
obtains. Our result, however, does not assume that the signals are indepen-
dent — a particularly poor assumption in an interdependent value auction —
or that they are drawn from a ﬁnite space.
4 Applications
Though Theorem 1 is straightforward, applying it to auctions is a bit tricky
as auctions with disclosure possibilities are inherently asymmetric, and it is
often diﬃcult to provide closed-form equilibrium characterizations in such
games. For the most part we will consider variants of the following simple
two-player pure common value ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction.5
5This model was introduced by Wilson (1967) and studied later by Wilson (1975),
Weverburgh (1979) and Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al.(1983).
81. Player 1 receives a veriﬁable signal W ∈ [wm,w M] drawn from the
atomless distribution function F (W).
2. Player 1 submits a bid b1(w) and player 2 submits a bid b2. Player 1
wins the good if and only if b1 ≥ b2. The payoﬀ to player i is w − bi if
he wins the object and 0 otherwise.
Note that player 1, and only player 1, is perfectly informed of the value of
the object. Henceforth we refer to this game as the one-sided common value
game. Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al (1983) show that this game has a unique
equilibrium in which player 1 chooses
b1(w,F)=EF [W | W ≤ w]( 3 )
and player 2 chooses b2(F) from [0,E F [W]] according to the distribution H
deﬁned by
H (b2(F) )=P r[ b1(w,F) ≤ b2(F)]. (4)
Given w, equilibrium payoﬀs are
ˆ u1(w,F)=F (w)(w − b1(w,F))
ˆ u2(F)=0
(5)
We note that expression (5) remains valid even if F is not atomless.
We now give player 1 the opportunity to disclose his information. Since
the signal is veriﬁable, the disclosure must be truthful. The players engage
in the following game:
1. Player 1 receives a signal w ∈ [wm,w M] according to the distribution
function F (w).
2. Player 1 chooses whether or not to disclose his signal w.
3. Each player submits a bid. Payoﬀs are:
u(b1,b 2)=
￿
(w − b1,0) if b1 ≥ b2
(0,w−b2)i f b1 <b 2
We will refer to this game as the one-sided common value disclosure game.
Player 1 never has an incentive to reveal his information in this game, since
if he does both players bid w, resulting in a payoﬀ of 0 to him. Thus there
is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which no disclosure takes place, so that
the addition of the revelation stage 2 is irrelevant. However, as discussed
in Section 2, this pure common value model is misleadingly restrictive in at
least two respects. The next two subsections address these respects.
94.1 Private Component
In the one-sided common value disclosure game, player 1 always ends up
with a proﬁt of zero when he discloses his signal. Crucial to this result is the
(extreme) assumption that the value of the good is the same to both players.
In this section we show that a continuous departure from this assumption
can have a discontinuous impact upon equilibrium behavior. Speciﬁcally, we
add a (possibly small) private component to 1’s valuation of the good. We
assume that this private component is common knowledge so that no new
informational considerations are introduced. The one-sided common value
game is usually considered to be a reasonable model of the auction of an oil
tract in which player 1 has a neighboring tract, and thus superior information.
The added private component can be thought of as an independent beneﬁt
player 1 would obtain from owning adjacent land, say from reduced clean-up
costs.
In the modiﬁed game, when player 1 wins the good with a bid of b1 ≥ b2
his payoﬀ is z1 + w − b1; when player 2 wins the good with a bid of b2 >b 1
her payoﬀ is (still) w − b2. As before, player 1’s only private information is
w, which is drawn from the distribution F; the parameter z1 > 0 is com-
mon knowledge. When z1 is small this game “approximates” the one-sided
common value game; in particular, revealing w yields player 1 about zero.
Nonetheless, adding this component has drastic consequences when player 1
is given the option to disclose his signal. Consider the following game.
1. Player 1 receives a signal w ∈ [wm,w M] according to the distribution
function F.
2. Player 1 chooses whether or not to disclose his signal w.
3. Each player submits a bid. Payoﬀs are:
u(b1,b 2)=
￿
(z1 + w −b1,0) if b1 ≥ b2
(0,w−b2)i f b1 <b 2
We assume that players use undominated strategies.
Recall that player 1’s signal is almost surely known if i) player 1 discloses
almost all signals in stage 2, or ii) the set of undisclosed signals with positive
measure is at most a singleton.
10Proposition 1 In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the above game, player
1’s signal is almost surely known.
The proposition is proved in the appendix by deﬁning the appropriate
disclosure game and applying Theorem 1. In essence, player 1 always strictly
wants to disclose a signal at the bottom of the support of his signals and an
unravelling ensues. One subtlety is worth observing. When Player 1 discloses
a signal at the bottom of the support, player 2’s bids are lowered in the ﬁrst
order stochastic domination sense. However, when 1 reveals signals close to
the bottom, while 2’s bids are “mostly” lowered, they are not lowered in the
same ﬁrst order sense. In order to conclude that player 1 wants to disclose
these bids as well (and hence obtain full unravelling) it is important that
player 1 strictly prefers revealing the bottom signal — hence the role of z1.
Note the discontinuity. For all z1 > 0, player 1’s signal is almost surely
known in any equilibrium and as z1 tends to 0, so do player 1’s proﬁts. On the
other hand, when z1 = 0 there is an equilibrium in which player 1 conceals
all signals and earns a positive proﬁt.
Let us return to the speciﬁc example of Section 2.1, where w ∼ U [0,1]
and 0 <z 1 < 1
2. In the standard sealed-bid auction in which player 1 is not


























1 +1 2 z2
1 +6 z1 +1
2z1 +1
.
6We believe this is the unique equilibrium of the sealed bid auction, though we have
not proved this.As z1 approaches 0, this equilibrium converges to player 1 bidding 1
2w





with cumulative distribution 2b, which is the equilibrium
of the auction in which z1 =0 .
11On the other hand, when given the possibility to reveal his signal, player




1 +1 2 z2
1 +6 z1 +1
2z1 +1
>z 1
In particular, when z1 = 0 the left hand side is
1
6. This is consistent with the
general belief in the literature that a player is harmed by relinquishing his
private information. Nonetheless, he relinquishes it.
Since z1 > 0 it is common knowledge that the good is worth more to
player 1 than player 2. We now show that the fact that some revelation
must take place does not depend upon this feature.
Suppose that z1 is an unveriﬁable random variable which may be positive
or negative. Speciﬁcally, consider the game
1. Player 1 receives the signals z1 and w, where w has support [0,1] and
z1 =
￿
a>0 with probability p ∈ (0,1)
−a with probability 1 − p
2. Player 1 chooses whether or not to disclose his signal w.
3. A good worth z1+w to player 1 and w to player 2 is sold via a sealed-bid
ﬁrst-price auction. If b1 = b2 player 1 decides who gets the good.
We are uncertain whether or not full revelation is necessary in this game
(though our belief is that it is not). In any case, as we now show, there must
be a positive measure of revelation.
Suppose on the contrary that r(w)=∅ for almost all w ∈ W.
i) We ﬁrst establish that in the auction equilibrium following a report of
∅, p(b2 =0 )￿= 1. Suppose on the contrary that p(b2 = 0) = 1. Player 1’s
best response to this is to always bid 0. But, given 1’s response, player 2 is
better oﬀ with a strategy of p(b2 = ε) = 1 for small enough ε.
ii) Thus, following a report of ∅, p(b2 =0 )< 1. Following a report of w,
in any undominated equilibrium, player 2 bids at most w. For small enough
w, player 1 should disclose when z1 = a, so that r(w)=w for a positive
measure of w ∈ W.
7We note that even if it turns out that the sealed-bid auction has other equilibria,
player 1’s signal is still revealed.The proof of Proposition 1 given in the appendix is not
tied to any speciﬁc equilibrium.
124.2 Imprecision
In the previous section we saw that a player will reveal his information if
there is some private component to the good’s value. In this section, we
show that absent a private component to the valuation, a player still fully
reveals his information if a fraction of the information remains private. This
is true even if the fraction of private information is arbitrarily small.
In the one-sided common value game, suppose that player 1 ﬁrst receives
an estimate of the good’s value. Speciﬁcally, 1 receives a veriﬁable signal
telling him in which one of n equal intervals the value of the object lies.
After choosing whether or not to disclose this information, he receives another
signal telling him the exact value. The bidders then play a ﬁrst-price sealed-
bid auction as before. For convenience we assume that wm =0a n dwM =1 ,
and that F has an associated density function f which is strictly positive on
[0,1]. Formally, we have:












2. Player 1 chooses whether or not to reveal x.







4. Each player submits a bid. Payoﬀs are:
u(b1,b 2)=
￿
(w − b1,0) if b1 ≥ b2
(0,w−b2)i f b1 <b 2
For large n, this game approximates the one-sided common value disclo-
sure game. However, equilibrium behavior is quite diﬀerent.
Proposition 2 In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game, player 1’s
signal is almost surely known.
An implication of Proposition 2 is that as n approaches inﬁnity, the dis-
closure game yields player 1 an arbitrarily small proﬁt. In contrast, if player
1 is somehow prevented from divulging his signal he earns a positive proﬁt
which is independent of n.
134.3 Pure Private Values
One reason for believing that a player beneﬁts from having private informa-
tion in an interdependent value auction is that winner’s curse fears depress
rivals’ bids. In this section we analyze a pure private values setting in which
there are no such fears. We ﬁnd that while the players reveal their informa-
tion, they are indeed not harmed by this revelation.
Consider a pure private values second-price auction where, in addition
to information about his own valuation, each player has private information
about the other player’s valuation. Speciﬁcally, v1 = z1+x2 and v2 = z2+x1,
where player i observes (zi,x i). Following the disclosure decisions, the players
engage in a second-price sealed-bid auction, where it is a dominant strategy
for each player to bid his (expected) value.
We deﬁne a disclosure game in which each player receives his expected
payoﬀ from a second-price auction. For ease of exposition (in the appendix),
we set z1 = z2 =0 .
1. Nature chooses xi ∈ [xm,x M] according to the strictly increasing atom-
less distribution function Fi,f o ri =1 ,2; player i is informed only of
xi.
2. Player i chooses whether or not to disclose xi.
3. Each player submits a bid. Payoﬀs are:
u(b1,b 2)=
￿
(x2 − b2,0) if b1 ≥ b2
(0,x 1 − b1)i f b1 <b 2
Proposition 3 In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game, the play-
ers’ signals are almost surely known. Furthermore, each player is better oﬀ
almost fully disclosing his signals than not disclosing any signals (regardless
of the disclosure policy of the other player).
While the players are not harmed by the disclosure of their information
in this pure private values game, it is not always true that with pure private
values, full disclosure does not harm a player. For instance, consider a ﬁrst-
price sealed-bid auction of a good worth xi to player i =1 ,2, where the
the xi’ are i.i.d U [0,1]. Player 1’s payoﬀ to this game is
1
6. On the other
hand, if his signal is always revealed he has a payoﬀ of
1
8 (Vickrey (1961)
14analyzes the game in which player 1’s signal is known). We note, however,
that in this game player 1 is not “forced” to reveal his signal. That is, there
is an equilibrium of the appropriate disclosure game in which no disclosure
is made.8
4.4 Seller Revelation
Recall that when the seller receives a signal in a symmetric aﬃliated signals
auction, then i) she maximizes ex ante revenues by committing to reveal
the signal and ii) even if she cannot make a such a commitment, she re-
veals the signal in the appropriate disclosure game. At this point the reader
may suspect that, despite appearances, these two statements are essentially
unrelated. The following asymmetric example conﬁrms this suspicion.
There are two bidders who receive unveriﬁable private signals x1 and x2
and a seller who receives a veriﬁable private signal s; all signals are drawn
from distributions with support [0,1]. The valuations of the bidders are,








. Suppose the good is sold using a second-price sealed-bid













whereas when S is disclosed the equilibrium price is
P
















so that here full disclosure is detri-
mental to the seller. Nevertheless, as we now show, absent commitment
possibilities the seller still fully discloses.
Consider the following game:
8This follows from the fact that player 1 is ex post harmed by the revelation of any
signal xi > 0.
9Krisha (2002) makes further distributional assumptions on the game, but these are
not necessary.
151. Bidder i receives a signal xi, and the seller receives a signal s.Th e
signals are independently drawn from distributions with support [0,1].
2. The seller chooses whether or not to disclose his signal s.
3. Each bidder submits a bid. Payoﬀs to the bidders are
ub(b1,b 2,s)=
￿
(x1 + α(x2 + s) − b2,0) if b1 ≥ b2
(0,x 2 − b1)i f b1 <b 2
while the payoﬀ to the seller is
us (b1,b 2,s)=m i n( b1,b 2)
Proposition 4 In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this game, the seller’s
signal is almost surely known.
5 Inducing Disclosure
In a pure common value auction, a player with no private information always
earns zero proﬁt; full disclosure is not inevitable, since it is never (strictly)
beneﬁcial for a player to reveal his signal. Nonetheless, we now show that the
seller can “force” full revelation by providing an arbitrarily small payment.
We do this in a general interdependent value setting, where the good may or
may not have a common value.
Consider a good worth v1(x1,x 2) to player 1 and v2(x1,x 2) to player 2,
where each vi is increasing in both arguments. The good is sold using a
second price auction. The seller oﬀers to pay ε>0 to any player that reveals
his information. Formally, we have
1. Nature chooses the signal xi according to the distribution Fi. Player i
is informed of xi.
2. Player i chooses whether or not to disclose his signal. Speciﬁcally, i
chooses ti ∈ {xi,∅}, where ti = ∅ indicates that i makes no disclosure.
3. Each player submits a bid. Payoﬀs are:
u(b1,b 2)=
￿
(v1(x1,x 2) − b2 + ε(t1),ε(t2)) if b1 ≥ b2
(ε(t1),v 2(x1,x 2) − b1 + ε(t2)) if b1 <b 2
where ε(ti)=
￿
ε if ti = xi
0i f ti = ∅
16Proposition 5 In any undominated perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the above
game, both players’ signals are almost surely known.
As an example, suppose that v1(x1,x 2)=v2(x1,x 2)=v(x1,x 2). If the
seller does not oﬀer a payment (ε = 0), there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in which no signals are disclosed. The symmetric equilibrium strategies in
the auction phase call for i to bid v(xi,x i). For any realization of signals,
the seller’s proﬁt is mini={1,2}v(xi,x i). On the other hand, if the seller oﬀers
ε>0, (essentially) all signals are known. The buyers bid v(x1,x 2) and the
seller’s proﬁt is v(x1,x 2)−ε ≈ v(x1,x 2) > minv(xi,x i) for small ε. Thus, in
this pure common value case, oﬀering a payment of ε results in a “virtually
optimal” auction (the seller extracts virtually all the surplus). Furthermore,
oﬀering a small payment can be used to design virtually optimal auctions in
many common value settings, of which the one-sided common value game of
Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al is one example.
6Ha r m f u l I n f o r m a t i o n
We now reconsider the imprecision model of section 4.2 to show that private
information may be harmful to a bidder.
There is a single good worth w ∼ U [0,1] to two players. Player 1 has two
types of signals potentially available to him, x which indicates in which one
of n equal intervals w lies and w itself. He must decide whether to receive
the signal x alone, or to receive x and w. In either case, player 2 is informed
of player 1’s decision.
First suppose that player 1 does not have the option of disclosing his
information. Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Weber (1982b) shows that player
1 prefers receiving both x and w to receiving x alone: more information is
better.
Now suppose that player 1 has the option of disclosing the signal x upon
receiving it. Will he prefer to receive only the estimate x,o rx and then the
precise signal w? We have already seen that if he receives the two signals,
then he will disclose his signal x. On the other hand if he receives only x
he never has an incentive to divulge it (since both players then bid E (w | x)
yielding player 1 zero). Thus, when player 1 receives only one signal there
is an equilibrium in which no information is revealed. This non-disclosure
equilibrium yields player 1 a higher payoﬀ than the disclosure equilibrium,
17so that he prefers less information to more. In particular, as the number of
intervals n →∞ , player 1’s equilibrium payoﬀ approaches 1
6 when he does
not disclose whereas his payoﬀ approaches 0 when he always discloses, as he
does when he receives two signals.
Milgrom and Weber (1982b) also argue that a bidder would rather gather
information on the value of an item overtly than covertly. Their intuition is
that overt information gathering induces a fear of the winner’s curse, which
causes the other players to bid timidly. Hence they would expect a specialist
to loudly proclaim his presence at an auction. Our intuition is quite diﬀerent.
The other players will not fear the winner’s curse as they know that the
specialist will disclose his information (unless, possibly, it is highly favorable).
Our specialist would prefer to send an anonymous proxy to do his bidding.
In the present context, suppose that both players know that player 1
knows x. With no disclosure possibilities, if player 1 is to receive the signal
w as well, he wants player 2 to be aware of this. With disclosure possibilities,
he prefers that player 2 be unaware that he has the extra information.10
7 Multiplicity
We have emphasized games in which the disclosure behavior is essentially
unique. We now consider multiplicity.
In the imprecision game of Section 4.2, a bidder receives two signals per-
taining to a good’s value — an initial estimate x, which he has the option of
disclosing, followed by an exact indication w. In any equilibrium the bidder
almost surely reveals his estimate.
We now modify the sequential nature of the signals by supposing that
player 1 receives both the estimate and the exact signal before he has the
opportunity to report the estimate, or the exact signal. With this change,
the game has many perfect Bayesian equilibria because player 2 can “punish”
player 1 with his beliefs. For instance, for all 0 ≤ j< n − 1 there is an
equilibrium in which player 1 always discloses xk
1 for k =0 ,...,j and never
discloses for k = j +1 ,...,n − 1; oﬀ the equilibrium path player 2 believes
that w = k+1
n if player 1 discloses xk
1 for k = j +1,...,n. Essentially, player 2
keeps player 1 from disclosing by threatening to believe that only the highest
10In Section 7.1 we consider a model in which player 2 is uncertain as to whether or not
player 1 is informed.
18type within an interval discloses.11
Consider again the one-sided common value disclosure game of section 4.
Suppose that w is drawn uniformly from [0,1]. There is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which player 1 never discloses his signal. Given a realization
w￿, he earns
1
2w￿2. A disclosure of w￿ would have earned player 1 zero. Al-
though disclosing his signal is never beneﬁcial to 1, there is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of this game in which player 1 always discloses his signal, thereby
earning 0. This equilibrium is supported by an out-of-equilibrium belief of
player 2 that w = 1 if no disclosure is made. Thus, the discontinuities we
noted in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 were failures of lower hemicontinuity.
This last example suggests that the conditions necessary for full disclosure
to obtain in some equilibrium, as opposed to all equilibria, are quite weak.
In an auction with aﬃliated signals it is typically bad for player i if the other
players think that he has received a high signal, since they then bid high.
Thus, suppose the signals are drawn from compact intervals and that each
player’s payoﬀs are minimized when the other players believe that he has
received his highest signal. Then there is a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in
which all players fully disclose, and silence by a player is interpreted to mean
that he has received his highest signal. In disclosure game terms, we have
the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Suppose that for each i there is a signal ¯ xi ∈ Xi such that for
all xi ∈ Xi and reporting strategies r, ui (xi,x i,r) ≥ ui(xi,∅,r) whenever
Fi (Xi =¯ xi |∅ ,r i)=1 . Then there exists a disclosure game equilibrium in
which all signals are disclosed.
7.1 Partial Revelation
If an agent always wants to disclose a signal that is at the bottom of the
support of his signals, then he will fully reveal his information in equilibrium;
that is the content of Theorem 1. The required condition is fairly strong,
but so is the conclusion. If we are only interested in knowing when some
11There seems to be no good reason for player 2 to have such a belief, but this game
does not have enough structure for reﬁnements such as sequential equilibrium to be of any
use.We note that if player 2 adopts the neutral posture of viewing out of equilibrium
moves as being mistakes that could just easily have been made by any player, then full
disclosure is the unique outcome.
19revelation must take place, then it is suﬃcient that some agent wants to
disclose starting from a situation of no disclosure.
We now consider an example with only partial revelation.
Consider a good worth x1 to player 1 and x2 to player 2. The xi’s are
independently drawn from U [0,1]. Player 1 observes x1 and with proba-
bility
1
2 observes x2 as well. He has the option of disclosing x2. Player 2
makes no observation. Following player 1’s disclosure decision a second-price
sealed-bid auction takes place. Note that for the ﬁrst time it is not common
knowledge that an informed agent is informed. This extension of the model
is of independent importance.
We ﬁrst establish that player 1 must disclose some (positive measure of)
signals whenever x1 > 0. If he does not, player 2 will bid
1
2 in the auction —
her expected value — and player 1 would then prefer to disclose any x2 < 1
2
whenever x1 > 1
2. On the other hand, player 1 will not disclose all his signals.
If he did, following no revelation 2 would bid
1
2 on the presumption that 1




The game has many partial revelation equilibria. For instance, in one




8C o n c l u s i o n
There seems to be a consensus in auction theory that bidders derive their
proﬁts from private information. In this paper we argue that the analysis of
this issue has been incomplete. The literature has considered the question
of the value of information to a bidder under the implicit assumption that
she will be able to keep her information private. However, this ability needs
to be demonstrated. In fact, as we have shown, in a variety of contexts the
bidders’ information will be revealed. This revelation may be complete, or
partial. In any case, there is little justiﬁcation for the presumption that no
information will be revealed. At the same time, the well-known result that
a seller will reveal her information is unrelated to the ex ante proﬁtability of
this revelation.
We oﬀer the following as a real world example of information disclosure
by bidders. In 1993 and 1994, one of us worked with a stock brokerage ﬁrm in
Uruguay. Before every auction of Government bonds, the largest participants
20in the market (most notably 3 banks, and 3 stockbrokers) hired the services of
economics consulting ﬁrms which, among other things, assessed the “quality”
or “value” of the bonds. Every market participant knew who the economic
advisors of each ﬁrm was and any information that could be shared by bidders
prior to the auction was of a veriﬁable nature. Invariably, in the hours that
preceded the submission of the bids, the market participants would call each
other up and share the information that their consultants had communicated.
Information was never shared regarding the actual prices to be submitted
and, to the best of our knowledge, collusion was not an issue in this market.
We interpret this situation as evidence in favor of our model. At the same
time, others can doubtlessly list situations where veriﬁable private informa-
tion remains private. The question for the theorist, then, is why?
9 Appendix
In this section we provide proofs of the theorems and propositions.
Proof of Theorem 1 . Suppose the conditions of the theorem are met
and let r∗ be a disclosure game equilibrium. Let ¯ yi be deﬁned by
¯ yi = min{SupportFi(·|∅ ,r i)}.
Thus, almost every signal below ¯ yi is revealed. Two cases must be considered.
Case 1: Fi{¯ yi <X i : r∗
i (Xi)=Xi} = Fi{¯ yi <X i}. That is, almost ev-
ery signal above ¯ yi is also revealed.
a) Fi {Xi =¯ yi} = 0. In this case, r∗
i (xi)=xi for almost all xi ∈ Xi.
b) Fi{Xi =¯ yi} > 0. In this case, almost every signal of player i is re-
vealed, with the possible exception of ¯ yi. If ¯ yi is revealed, almost every signal
is in fact revealed. If ¯ yi is not revealed, Fi (Xi =¯ yi |∅ ,r −i) = 1 since ¯ yi is
the only positive measure non-disclosing event.
Case 2: Fi{¯ yi <X i : r∗
i (Xi)=Xi} <F i {¯ yi <X i}. Then min{Support
Fi (·|∅ ,r i)} =¯ yi and Fi(Xi > ¯ yi |∅ ,r −i) > 0 so that, by assumption,
ui (¯ yi, ¯ yi,r
∗) >u i (¯ yi,∅,r
∗). (6)
Therefore r∗
i (¯ yi)=¯ yi.
a) There exists a ￿ y ∈ Xi, ￿ y>¯ yi such that (¯ yi,￿ y) ∩ Xi = ∅
Then, Fi {Xi < ￿ y : r∗
i (Xi)=Xi} = Fi{Xi < ￿ y} and ¯ yi < ￿ y,contradicting
the deﬁnition of ¯ yi.
21b): There is no ￿ y ∈ Xi, ￿ y>¯ yi such that (¯ yi,￿ y)∩ Xi = ∅. Since Xi is com-
pact, for ε small enough ¯ yi+ε ∈ Xi and by continuity ui (¯ yi + ε, ¯ yi + ε,r∗) >
ui(¯ yi + ε,∅,r∗). Thus, for small enough ε, r∗
i (¯ yi + ε)=¯ yi +ε, again contra-
dicting the deﬁnition of ¯ yi.
Proof of Proposition 1. We apply Theorem 1. In order to do this,
we must deﬁne the appropriate disclosure game. Let ˆ ui(w,z1,F) be player
i’s equilibrium payoﬀ in the ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction once player 1 has
seen w. If the auction has several equilibria then we choose an equilibrium
in undominated strategies. If there are several such equilibria then some
selection is made. The disclosure game is:
1. Player 1 receives a signal w ∈ [wm,w M] according to the distribution
function F.
2. Player 1 chooses t ∈ {w,∅}.
3. Player 1 receives
u1(w,t,r)=ˆ u1(w,z1,F(·|t,r))
If the auction in which 1’s signal is drawn from F (·|t,r) has no equi-
librium, we set ˆ u1(w,z1,F(·|t,r)) = 0.
First consider the ﬁrst-price sealed-bid auction. Since the object is worth
less to player 2 than player 1, and player 2 has no private information, 2
earns 0 in any equilibrium (see Theorem 2, in Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al.
(1983)). That is, EGˆ u2(w,z1,G) = 0 for any distribution function G over w.
In the unique undominated equilibrium of the sealed-bid auction where w
is common knowledge, player 1 wins the good for w.Th u s , u1(w,w,r)=z1
for all w, which is continuous.
Now consider the sealed-bid auction where the signals are drawn from
F (·|∅ ,r)w i t hm i n {Support F (·|∅ ,r)} = w and F (W>w|∅ ,r) > 0.
Given the signal w, if player 1 bids b1 he earns
p(b1)[ z1 + w − b1],
where p(b1) is the probability that a bid of b1 wins the object. We now show
that p(b1)[z1 + w − b1] <z 1.
22Clearly, p(b1)[z1 + w − b1] ≥ z1 only if b1 ≤ w.I fb1 = w then it must
be that p(w)=1 . Therefore all of 2’s bids are at most w and b1(w) ≤ w for
all w. But this cannot be an equilibrium, since 2 could earn a positive proﬁt
with a bid of w + ε, for small enough ε.
Therefore, all of 1’s winning bids must be strictly below w. But this
cannot be the case either since then player 2 could earn a positive proﬁt with
ab i do fw − ε, for small enough ε.
Hence, p(b1)[ z1 + w − b1] <z 1 so that u1(w,∅,r)=ˆ u1(w,z 1,F(·|∅ ,r)) <
z1 whenever min{Support F (·|∅ ,r)} = w and F (W>w|∅ ,r) > 0. Also
u1(w,∅,r) is clearly continuous in w.
The conditions of Theorem 1 are met, establishing the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2. We apply Theorem 1. In order to do this,
we ﬁrst deﬁne the appropriate disclosure game.












2. Player 1 chooses t ∈{ x,∅}.
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Suppose that min{Support F (·|∅ ,r)} = x and F (X>x|∅ ,r) > 0.
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where the inequality follows from the fact that F (w |∅ ,r) <F(w | x,r)f o r
all w>x
n.
To complete the proof, we note that continuity is trivially satisﬁed.
Proof of Proposition 3. We ﬁrst note that in the unique undomi-
nated equilibrium of a second-price auction, each player bids the conditional
expected value of the object.
Let r∗ be a reporting equilibrium strategy and suppose that, say, player
1 does not reveal a positive measure of signals. Deﬁne
xi = minSupportFi(·|∅ ,r
∗
i).
24By continuity, player 1 weakly prefers not to reveal x1. If 1 discloses x1 then
2 bids x1, whereas if 1 does not disclose x1, 2 bids E (x1 | ∅,r ∗
1) >x 1. Since 1
does not beneﬁt from revealing x1, he must win the object with probability
zero. This implies that for almost every revelation of player 2,player 1 bids
weakly less than x1, so that r∗
2 (x2)=∅ f o ra l m o s ta l lx2 >x 1. Hence,
x1 ≥ x2. Symmetric reasoning establishes that x1 = x2. But then, i) there is
a positive probability that player 2 does not disclose and ii) E (x2 |∅ ,r∗
2) >
x2 = x1, so that 1 wins the object with positive probability if he discloses
x1; a contradiction.
We now show that the ex ante payoﬀ to 1 from full disclosure is larger
than the payoﬀ from not revealing, regardless of 2’s revelation strategy. Let
E2 ≡ E (X2 |∅ ), NR ≡ r
−1
2 (∅) and let R be the set of types of 2 that
reveals, that is, R ≡ [xm,x M] − r
−1





























in (7) is a convex function of x1, so that the expected value with respect to






by Jensen’s inequality. Therefore, the ﬁrst term in (7) is larger than the ﬁrst
term in (8). Similarly, since max{E2 −x1,0} is a convex function of x1, its
expectation is larger than max{E2 − E1,0}, and so the second term in (7)
is larger than the second term in (8).
Proof of Proposition 4. We apply Theorem 1. In order to do this,
we ﬁrst deﬁne the appropriate disclosure game.
251. The seller receives a signal ˘ s from the distribution F (˘ s)f o r˘ s ∈ [0,1].
2. The seller reports t ∈ {˘ s,∅}
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￿


















1 − ˇ S | ˘ s,r
￿
<X 2
⇒ u(˘ s, ˘ s,r) >u(˘ s,∅,r)
Theorem 1 implies the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 5. If player 1’s signal, x, is known to player 2
then 2 bids v2(x,x2). Suppose that player 2 knows that x1 ≥ x. Then 2 bids
at least v2(x,x2) since for any realization of x, player 2 is glad to win the
good with a bid of v2(x,x2). Therefore, absent the payment of ε, revealing
x is at least as good as not revealing it, and with the payment, revealing x is
strictly better. Similarly for player 2’s signal. Theorem 1 implies the result.
Proof of Theorem 2. For all i, let r∗
i be such that r∗
i (xi)=xi for
all xi ∈ Xi, and set Fi(Xi =¯ xi |∅ ,r∗
i) = 1. The hypothesis of the theorem
implies that ui(xi,x i,r ∗) ≥ ui(xi,∅,r ∗) for all xi, so that r∗ is a disclosure
game equilibrium.
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